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Abstract 
This study is intent to identify and assess the economic and security importance to US 
and China by examining the nature and intensity of competitions, especially the geo-
strategic objectives of US and China in Asia Pacific. Examining and analyzing level of 
competition between US and China through the Global Competitiveness Index and the 
Global Fire Power Index by developing matrix level of competition for comparison be-
tween countries. 
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Аннотация 
Исследование направлено на оценку степени важности экономического разви-
тия и безопасности для США и Китая путем изучения характера и интенсивно-
сти конкуренции, а также геостратегических целей США и Китая в Азиатско-
Тихоокеанском регионе. Посредством матричного анализа межстрановой кон-
куренции, основанного на Глобальном индексе конкурентоспособности и Гло-
бальном индексе военной мощи, произведен обзор и анализ уровня конкурен-
ции между США и Китаем.  
Ключевые слова: глобальный индекс конкурентоспособности; глобальный 
индекс военной мощи; экономическое развитие и безопасность; геостратегиче-
ский; геополитика и геоэкономика 
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ECONOMIC RESEARCH  
US-China relations is a topic of intense 
debate among IR's scholars because the more 
dangerous a system of one super power is a sit-
uation where the two great-powers are firmly 
stood in the same region [6]. Joseph Nye [19] 
wrote that some US policy makers suggested 
the containment policy of China before it be-
came too strong. However, he rejected this ap-
proach and argued that US can engage and co-
operate with China in international liberal insti-
tutions established by US after WWII. “From 
that position of strength, the Americans could 
afford to engage China economically and so-
cially and see whether such forces would even-
tually transform China.” Instead of using mili-
tary containment policies to confirm that China 
is an enemy, the United States has continued its 
engagement policy while it has strengthened its 
alliance with Japan and South Korea in the tri-
angular balance to ensure that if engagement 
failed to work, there was a firm fallback posi-
tion. American experts and their Asian allies 
want to implement cooperative policy with 
China on the power of economic engagement 
or economic interdependence to change China 
from an authoritarian country to a free, liberal 
democracy. Yet, policy of engagement seems 
to be doomed. As Navarro [20] argued, “Not 
only does the authoritarian grip of the Chinese 
Communist Party seem to be tightening, but 
economic engagement is providing China with 
a supercharged economic engine to drive its 
military buildup”. Navarro added that in con-
trast to Nixionian pragmatism stands Bill Clin-
ton1 preferred idealistic vision of engagement 
                                                 
1 U.S. President Bill Clinton signs the U.S.-China Relations 
Act of 2000 in October [27], granting Beijing permanent nor-
mal trade relations with the United States and paving the way 
for China to join the World Trade Organization in 2001. Be-
tween 1980 and 2004, U.S.-China trade rises from $5 billion to 
taming American power2. Martin Jacques [12] 
also argued that the policy of engagement with 
China in the hope that China would become a 
modern western society is “guilty of underes-
timating what the rise of China represents”. 
George W. Bush's administration began to 
see Beijing as a "strategic peer competitor" in 
the early 2000s [23]. The Obama administra-
tion has decided on 'moving towards Asia' – a 
rebalancing of military assets as well as diplo-
matic attention. This policy “will create new 
points of stress and rising competition with 
China for influence in the region” [24]. Betts 
considered China a nation “most likely over 
time to disturb equilibrium in the region – and 
the world, and warned that ‘given the high 
Chinese economic growth rates and Beijing’s 
rising military spending the only recently over-
powered Soviet threat was actually a “compara-
tively modest challenge” [2]. Betts noted “It is 
hardly inevitable that China will be a threat to 
American interests, but the United States is 
much more likely to go to war with China than 
it is with any other major power” [3]. In a new 
national security strategy report based on 
Trump’s America First vision in which the US 
government defines China as a “revisionist 
                                                 
$231 billion. In 2006, China surpasses Mexico as the United 
States’ second-biggest trade partner, after Canada [25]. 
2 Navarro [20] stated that “Perhaps no American president has 
been more wrong about so much with such devastating eco-
nomic consequences. In the wake of China's joining the World 
Trade Organization, Clinton's corporate backers would begin a 
massive offshoring exodus to China that would help lead to the 
closing of over seventy thousand American factories; the num-
ber of unemployed and underemployed workers would eventu-
ally swell to over twenty-five million; and America's massive 
trade deficit would swell to over $300 billion annually, leaving 
America in debt to China to the tune of trillions of dollars.” 
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country” and a “strategic competitor” seeking 
to erode US security and prosperity. US Indo-
Pacific strategy is part of a policy to contain 
China that will also contribute to a bumpier Si-
no-US relations which entails increased coop-
eration between the US, Japan, Australia and 
India aimed at countering the ever-expanding 
clout that China is wielding in Asia [18]. 
Diplomatic Relations and Its Trends 
Since 1949, Sino-US relations have 
evolved from tense standoffs to a complex mix 
of intensifying diplomacy, growing interna-
tional rivalry, and increasingly intertwined 
economies [25]. On January 1, 1979, ambassa-
dorial-level diplomatic relations between US 
and PRC was established and realized normali-
zation of Sino-US ties [17]. The cooperation 
between the two countries brings benefits to 
their economic development and security, 
bringing the fall down of USSR. After the col-
lapse of USSR, US strategic thinkers have been 
considering PRC as a new threat to US interest, 
especially in Asia-pacific. In the changeable 
situation of the world today, relation between 
the two countries are intricate and complex, 
anti-China forces dishes out the “China threat 
theory”, but PRC still insisted that as a “status 
quo” power, PRC will enjoy in economic coop-
eration with a peaceful rise and commitment to 
be a responsible great power in international 
political order. Xi Jinping convinced that “we 
Chinese love peace”, we will never seek ag-
gression and expansion and will never com-
promise on defending its sovereignty [21]. In  
the interest of peace, China will remain com-
mitted to peaceful development. No matter how 
much stronger it may become, China will never 
seek hegemony or expansion [22]. However 
what china’s claim of being peaceful rise, but if 
we look at china’s history after the civil war, it 
may be possible to analyze Chinese behavior 
after the Communist Party of China ruled in 
1949, and that China would adopt a revisionist 
strategic approach. Through the occupation of 
Tibet's territory3, China's involvement in the 
Korean Peninsula4, the Vietnam War, the war 
with India, the war with the former Soviet Un-
ion5, the territorial claims at the East China Sea 
and South China Sea, especially Chinese jets 
interception of US surveillance plane are re-
flected China’s proactive and assertive foreign 
policy as a revisionist state. When economic 
power drives China toward superpower posi-
tion, China will have to show its full range of 
military and political muscles, even it wants or 
not [16]. 
                                                 
3 Nine years after the People’s Republic of China asserts con-
trol over Tibet, a widespread uprising occurs in Lhasa. Thou-
sands die in the ensuing crackdown by PRC forces, and the 
Dalai Lama flees to India. The United States joins the United 
Nations in condemning Beijing for human rights abuses in 
Tibet, while the Central Intelligence Agency helps arm the 
Tibetan resistance beginning in the late 1950s [25]. 
4 In June 1950, Korean War Breaks Out. The Soviet-backed 
North Korean People’s Army invades South Korea on June 25. 
The United Nations and the United States rush to South Ko-
rea’s defense. China, in support of the communist North, retali-
ates when U.S., UN, and South Korean troops approach the 
Chinese border. As many as four million people die in the 
three-year conflict until the United Nations, China, and North 
Korea sign an armistice agreement in 1953. 
5 Differences over security, ideology, and development models 
strain Sino-Soviet relations. China’s radical industrialization 
policies, known as the Great Leap Forward, lead the Soviet 
Union to withdraw advisors in 1960. Disagreements culminate 
in border skirmishes in March 1969. Moscow replaces Wash-
ington as China’s biggest threat, and the Sino-Soviet split con-
tributes to Beijing’s eventual rapprochement with the United 
States [25]. 
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Christen [4] argued that “even US capabili-
ties in economic, military and social terms are 
better than PRC, but PRC still can pose major 
challenges to US security interest. As Denny 
Roy [7] argued that “a stronger China is likely 
to undermine peace in the region. Economic 
development will make China more assertive 
and less cooperative with its neighbors; China's 
domestic characteristics make it comparatively 
likely to use force to achieve its political goals; 
and an economically powerful China may pro-
voke a military buildup by Japan, plunging 
Asia into a new cold war.” Whereas Hunting-
ton [9] described the US-China relations as 
“potentially most dangerous” rivalry because of 
the issues like trade, human rights, arms sales, 
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruc-
tion, Tibet, and Taiwan. The fundamental issue, 
however, is one of power reinforced by pro-
found civilizational differences. The Chinese 
have made it clear that they see their era of 
subordination to and humiliation by other ma-
jor powers coming to an end and that they ex-
pect to resume the hegemonic position that they 
had in East Asia until the mid-nineteenth centu-
ry. The United States, on the other hand, has 
always opposed the domination of Western Eu-
rope or East Asia by any single power and in 
the last century fought and won two world wars 
and one Cold War to prevent that from happen-
ing. Whether conflict or accommodation will 
characterize US-China relations is thus central 
to the future of world peace.” 
Condoleeza Rice [5] also mentioned that 
China wants to challenge US dominent in Asia  
 
Pacific region in its favor6. Ikenberry [10] 
believed that East Asian region would become 
a bipolar system7 contested by the US and PRC 
rivalry and in response US would prefer con-
                                                 
6 She states that: “China is still a potential threat to stability in 
the Asia-Pacific region. Its military power is currently no 
match for that of the United States. But that condition is not 
necessarily permanent. What we do know is that China is a 
great power with unresolved vital interests, particularly 
concerning Taiwan and the South China Sea. China resents the 
role of the United States in the Asia-Pacific region. This means 
that China is not a "status quo" power but one that would like 
to alter Asia's balance of power in its own favor. That alone 
makes it a strategic competitor, not the "strategic partner" the 
Clinton administration once called it” [5]. 
7 He stated that “Bipolarity will emerge in a process of Sino-
American action and reaction leading to conflict and 
geopolitical balancing. A premise behind  this  possibility  is  that  
China’s  economic  and  military  growth  will increasingly thrust 
China into a role as regional rival, challenging American’s 
hegemonic position in the region. An increasingly powerful China 
might be tempted to ‘test the waters,’ that is, probe the willingness 
of the United States to engage as Chinese officials spread their 
influence across the region. Tests could occur over Taiwan, the 
South China Sea, political instability in Indonesia, or perhaps the 
use of nuclear weapons by one party or the other. As China sought 
to challenge the legitimacy of a US-dominated regional system and 
propose its own alternative, it would seek the support of other 
states in the region” and “In turn, the United States would likely 
respond by shifting from engagement of China to more active 
confrontation and containment. Any combination of China’s 
questionable human rights practices, its nuclear espionage, its 
transfer of chemical and nuclear technology to other states hostile 
to the United States, its  refusal  to  recognise  US-supported  
investment  and  intellectual  property rights, and its old-style anti-
American rhetoric could provide the impetus for a hard-line 
American response. In this scenario, the United States would seek 
to strengthen its bilateral alliances with Japan and South Korea and 
direct them  far  more  explicitly  at  the  Chinese  target.  China  
would  counter  by soliciting its own regional allies—perhaps even 
Russia and India”[10]. 
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frontation and containment policies rather than 
engagement to maintain balance of power. 
However, China views US as a most serious 
threat to its security. As a revisionist state, Chi-
na will challenge the preeminent US position in 
the region to alter the old world order with its 
“proactive” foreign policy [16] and with a Chi-
nese world’s views on socialism with Chinese 
characteristics [15]. Conversely, US considers 
China as peer-competitor to seriously challenge 
US’s interests in the region. 
Economic Aspects in US-China  
Relations 
China in the last three decades has been 
being busy championing trade deal around the 
globe, building up some of the world biggest 
companies, taking over some international real-
estate markets, building up networks of energy 
powerhouse. China is the largest trading part-
ner for more than 130 countries and the largest 
cargo trader for many years as well as being the 
largest exporter and second largest importer in 
the world [11]. China has push for global eco-
nomic leadership in Launching the Asian Infra-
structure and Investment Bank (AIIB), One 
Belt One Road Initiative (OBOR) and the pro-
posed Free Trade Area of the Asia Pacific. 
China has opened 104 of its 160 services sec-
tors to foreign investors according its member-
ship to World Trade Organization (WTO) [1], 
when much of the world, especially US and 
Europe are not certain about the impact of eco-
nomic globalization. For more than a century, 
the United States has been the world's biggest 
economy, accounting for over 24.7% of the 
world’s gross domestic product (GDP) in 2016. 
Infographic from the Visual Capitalist [14] 
shows, US is the largest economy in the world 
on nominal basis where as China is largest on 
PPP basis. US is ahead of China by 7170 bil-
lion US Dollar in 2016. In September 2008, 
China surpasses Japan to become the largest 
holder of US debt—or treasuries – at around 
$600 billion [25].  
The Chinese government has achieved this 
high growth through reliance on old drivers: 
credit and real estate. However, the govern-
ment’s unwillingness to allow the market to 
play a bigger role has resulted in deteriorating 
investment efficiency, meaning higher levels of 
debt are necessary to generate growth. House-
hold consumption—an essential element of 
China’s economic rebalancing—is growing but 
at a sluggish pace due to the slow rate of re-
form. China’s high and rising debt levels pose a 
growing threat to the country’s financial stabil-
ity. China’s total debt reached $27.5 trillion, or 
257 percent of GDP, at the end of 2016. The 
dramatic rise in China’s debt burden can be at-
tributed to the relentless expansion of credit the 
government has relied on to generate growth 
since the global financial crisis [26, P.2]. 
The US trade relationship with China re-
mains extremely unbalanced, as evidenced by a 
substantial goods deficit, which totaled $347 
billion in 2016. The goods deficit decreased 5.5 
percent year-on-year in 2016, driven by declin-
ing US imports from China, which dropped 4.3 
percent to $463 billion. US goods exports re-
mained flat, declining 0.3 percent over 2015 
levels to $116 billion. China continues to dom-
inate the United States’ global deficit in trade 
in goods. In 2016 the United States’ goods def-
icit with China was equal to 47 percent of its 
total deficit, down from 49 percent in 2015. In 
the first eight months of 2017, the goods deficit 
increased 6.2 percent to $239.1 billion, with 
U.S. exports to China reaching $80.2 billion, an 
increase of 15 percent year-on-year, while im-
ports from China grew 8.3 percent year-on-year 
to $319.3 billion. In 2016, the US services 
trade surplus with China reached a record high 
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of $37 billion, driven almost entirely by an in-
crease in Chinese tourism to the United States 
[26, P.2]. US attracted more than $373 billion 
of global FDI flows in 2016, of which around 
$27.6 billion, or 7.4 percent, came from China. 
From 2010 to 2016, Rhodium Group estimates 
annual Chinese investment in the US rose from 
$4.6 billion to $46.2 billion. There are potential 
economic benefits of investment: Chinese FDI 
can help US firms secure the capital necessary 
to grow their business and hire more workers, 
leading to an expansion of the U.S. tax base, 
improving productivity, and raising overall 
competitiveness8.  
According to the Global competitiveness 
index [8], US is the second most competitive 
country on earth where China ranked on 27th 
place (See table 1). In Annex 1, we compare 
the 12 pillars of GCI between US and China by 
ranking and score then developed a matrix lev-
el of competition in table 2. As identified in the 
12 pillars of the GCI, US is more competitive 
than China in all pillars besides market size and 
macro-economic context. 
                                                 
8 In 2016, Rhodium Group estimates Chinese companies added 
approximately 50,000 US jobs, bringing the total number of US 
jobs provided by Chinese companies to 141,000. However, Chi-
nese investment can also pose risks to the United States, with 
Chinese FDI targeting sectors of strategic importance to the 
United States. Given the state’s controlling position in the Chi-
nese economy and the opaque nature of its role in business ac-
tivities, these investments raise concerns about the ability of US 
regulators to manage the risks of investment from state-
influenced entities. Chinese investments, for example, raise con-
cerns about the transfers of valuable US technologies to China. 
They can also make it more difficult for US firms to compete in 
international markets due to the anticompetitive practices of 
many Chinese firms [26]. 
Security Aspects in US-China Relations 
In terms of military spending per capita, 
China is still behind the United States. In terms of 
total military expenditures, China spends the sec-
ond most worldwide with a total of approximate-
ly 216 billion US Dollar per year, where the US – 
609 billion US Dollar. In the US consists of 1.43 
million active military personnel, where in China 
– 2.33 million. In term of military expenditure in 
the percentage to the GDP, China spends about 
2.1% of its annual GDP on military, and the 
United States spends 3.8%. The US has 133 mili-
tary bases outside of its territory, and China has 
one base in Djibouti, Africa which is at the 
southern entrance to the red sea on the route to 
Suez Canal. More specifically, US has bases in 
multiple jurisdictions that surround China: South 
Korea, Kyrgyzstan, Japan, Singapore, Guam, Af-
ghanistan, and Diego Garcia, a set of small is-
lands in Indian Ocean. The US has 7315 nuclear 
warheads and 121 military satellites, where China 
has only 250 nuclear warheads and 24 military 
satellites [13]. According to the Global Fire Pow-
er Index 2017, US ranks the first place in military 
power ranking, where PRC stands in the third 
place (See table 3). 
China was the third-largest arms exporter 
worldwide in aggregate terms during the 2012–
2016 periods with $8.8 billion in exports, fol-
lowing the United States with $47.2 billion and 
Russia with $33.2 billion. Comparing five-year 
periods, China’s exports of major arms rose 74 
percent from $4.5 billion between 2007–2011 
and 2012–2016 while US and Russian exports 
rose 21 and 4.7 percent, respectively, meaning 
China’s share of global arms sales rose from 
3.8 to 6.2 percent. During the past five years 
China has sold arms to 44 countries, with Paki-
stan (35 percent), Bangladesh (18 percent), and 
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Burma (10 percent) as top recipients. China’s 
customer base has also expanded across Africa, 
Asia, and South America, with its exports to 
countries in Africa rising 122 percent over the 
previous five-year period, and exports to for-
mer Soviet countries (Kazakhstan and Turk-
menistan) for the first time in 2016. All recipi-
ents of China’s arms exports to date have been 
low- and middle-income countries [26, p. 177]. 
Таблица 1 
Глобальный индекс конкурентоспособности – GCI 2017-2018 
Table 1 










Economy Rank Score Rank Score Rank Score Rank Score 
US 2 5.85 25 5.54 1 6.01 2 5.8 
PRC 27 5 31 5.32 28 4.88 29 4.33 
 
Таблица 2 
Матричный уровень конкуренции между США и КНР, GCI 2017-2018 
Table 2 
Matrix Level of Competition between US and PRC, GCI 2017-2018 
 
Таблица 3 
Глобальный индекс военной мощи – GFP 2017 
Table 3 
















US 1 323,995,528 2,363,675 13,762 5,884 415 19 
PRC 3 1,373,541,278 3,712,500 2,955 6,457 714 1 
 
                                                 
9 See: https://www.globalfirepower.com 
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Despite efforts by the Trump and Xi ad-
ministrations to set a positive tone for the bilat-
eral relationship in early 2017, US-China rela-
tions suffered from tensions over longstanding 
disagreements such as the South China Sea, 
Taiwan, and especially North Korea10. Presi-
dent Trump and President Xi held their first 
face-to-face meeting at a summit in April 2017 
and established a new framework for bilateral 
security relations. The two sides agreed to initi-
ate a new “US-China Comprehensive Dia-
logue.” This features four “pillars” of dialogue 
on diplomatic and security, economic, law en-
forcement and cybersecurity, and social and 
cultural issues. This framework replaces the 
US-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue 
begun under the Obama Administration. Ac-
cording to US officials, the two sides addition-
ally “had candid discussions on regional and 
maritime security” and “reaffirmed their com-
mitment to a denuclearized Korean peninsula,” 
without discussing specific arrangements. Alt-
hough the US side affirmed it is prepared to 
take action on the Korean Peninsula without 
China, the Chinese side argued military actions 
should be stopped in exchange for North Korea 
halting its nuclear program. President Trump 
reportedly emphasized US support for interna-
tional norms in the East and South China seas 
and opposition to militarization of disputed ar-
eas, and President Xi emphasized his desire for 
US participation in China’s OBOR initiative 
and for US cooperation in returning Chinese fu-
gitives to China [26, p. 179]. 
Since the summit, China’s Foreign Minis-
try spokesperson has referred to “the consensus 
achieved” there, later criticizing a US arms sale 
to Taiwan and US sanctions on North Korea 
                                                 
10 China has refrained from imposing overly punitive sanctions 
on North Korea for fear of causing a collapse that would result 
in refugees flooding the economically vulnerable north-east. 
that target a Chinese bank as going against this 
“consensus,” but US officials have not referred 
to this supposed “consensus.” The United 
States and China held the first “pillar” dia-
logue, the US-China Diplomatic and Security 
Dialogue, in Washington, DC, in June 2017. 
Statements from the US side following the 
meeting noted discussion on areas of agreement 
such as the need to achieve a denuclearized 
North Korea, as well as frank exchanges on 
China’s responsibility to exert greater pressure 
on North Korea, China’s actions in the South 
China Sea, and China’s human rights record. 
Statements by China also cited a “constructive 
and fruitful” dialogue, but stressed the need for 
US respect of China’s political systems, devel-
opment path, sovereignty, and territorial integ-
rity; its opposition to U.S. missile defense de-
ployments in South Korea; and its desire for 
strengthened exchanges and cooperation in 
counterterrorism [26, P. 179]. 
Strategically, the Trump administration’s 
NSS [18] identifies the security of the US 
homeland, particularly against terrorist threats 
and weapons of mass destruction, as a priority; 
recognize that promoting economic prosperity11 
is core to sustained US global leadership; high-
light the value of preserving an open and liberal 
                                                 
11 Michael Green, senior vice-president for Asia at Center for 
Strategic and International Studies, said the US’ withdrawal 
from the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) trade pact has harmed 
the US’ credibility in the region. It has also reduced Washing-
ton’s diplomatic toolkit to “zero-sum unilateral measures” such 
as the trade actions or military instruments. “It weakens US’ 
hand in managing China in a peaceful way,” “It also weaken 
allies and partners’ confidence in US leadership and emboldens 
China’s expectations.” But on the upside, he believes there are 
several ongoing factors that can reinforce cooperation between 
the two countries. One is the leadership of Chinese president Xi 
Jinping, which retained “strong elements of Dengism” and a 
preference to avoid direct confrontation with the US [28].  
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international order that has often times benefit-
ed the US; and underscore the importance of 
preserving core American principles and val-
ues. Professor Jin Canrong, a Chinese govern-
ment adviser, warned US-China Relations are 
headed towards trouble, as the latest National 
Security Strategy Report in which the US gov-
ernment defines China as a “revisionist coun-
try” and a “strategic competitor”, as well as 
several “very provocative suggestions” on 
Taiwan made in the US Congress [28]. US-
China relations should be embedded in a larger 
set of stable US political, security, and eco-
nomic ties. It will require a greater commitment 
to the region, of strategic thinking, time, re-
sources, and energy. Pyongyang’s nuclear 
weapons program could tilt US-China relations 
towards either increased collaboration or fur-
ther confrontation. 
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Приложение 
 
12 столпов конкурентоспособности по индексу GCI, сравнение между США и Китаем 
 
Annex 
The 12 pillars of GCI12 Comparison between US and China 
 
                                                 
12 Improving the determinants of competitiveness, as identified in the 12 pillars, requires the coordinated action of the state, the business 
community, and civil society. All societal actors need to be engaged to make progress on all factors of competitiveness in parallel, which is 
necessary to achieve long-lasting results. The GCI points to three main challenges that are relevant for economic progress, public-private 
collaboration, and policy action: first, financial vulnerabilities pose a threat to competitiveness and to economies’ ability to finance innova-
tion and technological adoption; second, emerging economies are becoming better at innovation but more can be done to spread the benefits; 
third, labor market flexibility and worker protection are needed for competitiveness and shared prosperity in the Fourth Industrial  
Revolution [8]. 
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